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Casenotes
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY V. OHIO & THE
FEDERAL FACILITY COMPLIANCE ACT OF 1992: THE
SUPREME COURT FORCES A HAZARDOUS COMPROMISE
IN CWA AND RCRA ENFORCEMENT AGAINST
FEDERAL AGENCIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite Congress' enactment of several far-reaching environ-
mental statutes within the past two decades, the federal govern-
ment itself has earned the reputation as one of the nation's worst
polluters.' States have attempted to bring certain federal agen-
cies into compliance with both federal and state statutory require-
ments under the Clean Water Act (CWA) 2 and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 3 Those agencies, how-
l. Within the past several years, many commentators in the area of environ-
mental law have recognized the federal government's irresponsible handling of
its own facilities. See generally Adam Babich, Circumventing Environmental Laws:
Does the Sovereign Have a License to Pollute?, 6 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 28 (Sum-
mer 1991); Elizabeth Cheng, Comment, Lawmaker as Lawbreaker: Assessing Civil
Penalties Against Federal Facilities Under RCRA, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 845 (1991);
Nancy E. Milstein, Note, How Well Can States Enforce Their Environmental Laws
When the Polluter Is the Federal Government?, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 123 (1986);J.B. Wol-
verton, Note, Sovereign Immunity and National Priorities: Enforcing Federal Facilities'
Compliance with Environmental Statutes, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 565 (1991).
Congressional studies of the subject have found that federal agencies' com-
pliance rates with federal environmental statutes generally lag 10-15% behind
those of private industry. See H.R. REP. No. 111, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 3
(1991) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 111], reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1287,
1288. With the CWA in particular, federal agencies have twice the non-compli-
ance rates as those of private companies. Id. Furthermore, a General Account-
ing Office (GAO) study in 1986 discovered that half of the federal hazardous
waste handlers were guilty of some sort of statutory violation. See S. REP. No.
67, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 67]. The situation
at federal facilities has become so notorious that even ROLLING STONE magazine
has commented on the issue. See Babich, supra, at 28 (citing Kohn, America's
Worst Polluter, ROLLING STONE, May 3, 1990, at 47).
The Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy (DOE), the
two agencies which most often handle nuclear or other hazardous waste, have
flouted federal and state statutory requirements the most often. Id. at 28; Wol-
verton, supra, at 568-69. "A combination of excessive secrecy, lack of independ-
ent oversight, and an overemphasis on [DOD's and DOE's] primary mission has
resulted in some horrendously contaminated real estate." Babich, supra, at 28.
2. CWA §§ 101-67, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
3. RCRA §§ 3001-5006, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6956 (1988 & Supp. 1992)).
(363)
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ever, have repeatedly resisted those efforts and continue to pol-
lute or to avoid remedying their past environmental
transgressions. 4
Indicative of this conflict is the State of Ohio's six-year strug-
gle to force the United States Department of Energy (DOE) to
clean up its highly-contaminated Fernald, Ohio uranium-process-
ing plant.5 In response to Ohio's request for courts to impose
civil penalties under the CWA and RCRA, the federal govern-
ment, according to its custom in such matters, invoked the de-
fense of sovereign immunity. 6 The Supreme Court, agreeing with
RCRA is an amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992(k) (1988 & Supp. 1992)).
4. See Babich, supra note 1, at 28. For many years now, states have "[met]
with no success in enforcing their environmental statutes against federal facili-
ties." Milstein, supra note 1, at 124 (citing Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167
(1976)). Federal agencies find litigation to be the best method of putting off
compliance with state regulations; as one commentator noted, "[n]o loophole, it
seems, is too small to be found by the federal government." Babich, supra note
1, at 28 (quoting Senator Stafford).
5. DOE's activities at the Fernald bomb-production plant demonstrate the
magnitude of federal negligence in taking care of the environment. The plant,
which holds radioactive waste dating from as far back as the Manhattan Project
of the 1940's, has emitted an estimated 561,000 pounds of uranium into the air
and water. Michael B. Lafferty, Ohio Isn't Happy with Cleanup at Fernald, COLUM-
BUS DISPATCH, Feb. 7, 1991, at IA. The contractor hired by DOE to operate the
plant warned the agency of the danger, but DOE failed to act to prevent contam-
ination of the surrounding area. S. REP. No. 67, supra note 1, at 3. The plant
still poses a health hazard to surrounding neighborhoods' groundwater, as foot-
ball-field-sized tanks filled with uranium waste are presently deteriorating. Laf-
ferty, supra, at IA; H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 1, at 3-4, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1289-90.
The federal government already must pay $78 million to citizens living near
the plant in settlement of the neighbors' suit brought for present and future
health costs. Fernald Toxic Waste Case Goes Before U.S. Supreme Court, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Dec. 2, 1991, at 2B (Associated Press report). After learning of the
extent of the contamination in 1986, the State of Ohio brought suit against
DOE, asking a district court to enjoin the plant from operating in a manner
inconsistent with state environmental requirements, and for $250,000 in civil
penalties. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.
Ohio 1986); Roger K. Lowe, Court Says Federal Government Can't Be Fined for Pollu-
tion Mess at Fernald Plant, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 22, 1992, at IA. The rele-
vant Ohio statutes are OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734 (Baldwin 1993) (Ohio Solid
& Hazardous Waste Act (OSHWA) (authorized by RCRA)) and OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 6111 (Ohio Water Pollution Control Act (OWPCA) (authorized by
CWA)). The Fernald plant did not have a RCRA permit as required by OSHWA.
United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1632 n.3 (1992). The
plant also exceeded " 'certain of the effluent limitations set forth' " in its
OWPCA permit. Id. at 1640 (White, J., dissenting in part) (citing DOE's Answer
at 28, 33).
6. See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1632 (1992).
"[T]he Federal Government often invokes the cloak of sovereign immunity to
shield it from prosecution for its violations of those environmental laws and
compliance plans." Elizabeth K. Hocking, Survey, Federal Facility Violations of the
2
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DOE's arguments, held that the waivers of sovereign immunity
present in the CWA and RCRA extend only to coercive (or proce-
dural) fines and not to civil.(or punitive) penalties. 7
This Note illustrates how the Supreme Court's protection of
the federal government from punitive fines on the basis of sover-
eign immunity in United States Department of Energy v. Ohio" forced
Congress to compromise with DOE in order to bring the agency's
facilities into compliance with RCRA. Part I of this Note will ad-
dress how the Court's tradition of requiring unequivocal statutory
waivers of sovereign immunity prevented states from forcing fed-
eral agencies into compliance with federal and state environmen-
tal laws. Part II will review the Ohio Court's refined statutory
analysis that found waivers of federal government immunity to
coercive, procedure-based penalties, and will demonstrate that
the Court more reasonably could have found waivers to all civil
penalties in both the CWA and RCRA.9 Part III will discuss the
Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992 (FFCA), Congress' re-
sponse to the Ohio Court's RCRA holdings, and the potentially
troublesome loopholes it leaves open. Finally, Part IV will ex-
amine the gaps created by the Ohio decision in the original statu-
tory plan to combat federal facility pollution and their possible
effects on this environmental dilemma.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Questionable Role of Sovereign Immunity,
5 ADMIN. L.J. 203, 205 (1991).
7. Ohio, 112 S.Ct. at 1635-40. Previously, the district court for the Eastern
District of Ohio had found waivers of sovereign immunity to civil penalties
within both the CWA and RCRA. Ohio v. United States Dept. of Energy, 689 F.
Supp. 760 (E.D. Ohio 1988). The Sixth Circuit, however, decided that the CWA
federal facilities section (33 U.S.C. § 1923) and the RCRA citizen suit section(42 U.S.C. § 6961) waived federal government immunity to civil penalties. Ohio
v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990).
For a detailed discussion of the Sixth Circuit's holding, see Colleen Kraft
Shields, The Federal Government: Finally Paying Its Environmental Dues: State of
Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 439 (1990).
8. 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
9. This Note will not consider the Supreme Court's RCRA federal facilities
analysis, as there appears to be general agreement among courts and other au-
thorities that the section does not adequately waive sovereign immunity. See,
e.g., Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1644 (White, J., concurring in majority's RCRA federal
facilities analysis); Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th
Cir. 1990).
For opposing viewpoints, see generally Cheng, supra note 1, at 859-60;
James B. Dilsheim, Note, Sovereign Immunity Under Section 6001 of the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act-Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air Force, 64 TEMP. L.
REV. 833 (1991); Shields, supra note 7.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. CWA and RCRA Waivers of Sovereign Immunity
Congress, in enacting the CWA and RCRA, intended to es-
tablish a "cooperative federalism" between state and federal envi-
ronmental agencies whereby states would administer and enforce
environmental provisions while the federal government would es-
tablish the minimum guidelines that state programs must meet.' 0
To aid in this enforcement, Congress enacted provisions within
both statutes which permit citizens" l to bring civil actions against
polluters for failure to meet state requirements promulgated
under the authority of the CWA and RCRA.' 2
During the mid-1970s, states recognized that certain federal
agencies were among the most frequent, dangerous, and blatant
10. Ohio, 1.12 S. Ct. at 1643 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1054 (1992)); Milstein, supra note 1, at 124.
The structure of the CWA permit and enforcement program has been de-
scribed as follows:
The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) autho-
rizes the Administrator of the EPA to issue a permit for the discharge of
pollutants into navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1). The Admin-
istrator's permit program is subject to the same terms, conditions and
requirements as apply to a State permit program under this section. 33
U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3). A State may submit a proposed permit program to
the Administrator, who will approve the program unless he or she de-
termines that the State lacks authority to administer. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b). Among other things, the State must have authority to abate
violations of the permit or the permit program through imposition of
civil and criminal penalties and other ways and means of enforcement.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7). If the State program is approved, the Federal
permit program must be withdrawn. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1). The State
program must then be administered in accordance with Federal guide-
lines. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(2).
Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760, 767 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
For a general discussion of the program, see Mike Rothmel, Note, When Will the
Federal Government Waive the Sovereign Immunity Defense and Dispose of Its Violations
Properly?, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 581, 584-86 (1989).
RCRA also employs a permit system under which handlers of solid waste
must meet federal or state standards. See RCRA § 3006, 42 U.S.C. § 6926. The
state may issue its own permits if its standards are at least as stringent as the
national standards and if it provides for adequate enforcement of the permit
requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b).
11. According to the Supreme Court, states are within the CWA and RCRA
definitions of "citizen," and therefore may bring suit against the federal govern-
ment. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1634 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(15)).
12. The CWA citizen suit provision is at CWA § 505(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a). The RCRA citizen suit provision is at RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972. The CWA federal facility provision is at CWA § 313(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1323(a).
4
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violators of state and federal environmental laws. 13 Initially, state
environmental agencies tried to sign federal agencies to compli-
ance agreements. 14 However, even if the states were successful in
concluding such agreements, the signatory federal agencies usu-
ally refused to honor the terms and failed to pay fines as stipu-
lated.' 5 As a result, states brought suits against those offending
federal agencies to force compliance by asking for monetary puni-
tive fines. 16
Those states soon encountered an obstacle when the
Supreme Court held in Hancock v. Train 17 and EPA v. California ex
rel. State Water Resources Control Board 18 that the United States was
not subject to state requirements under either of the original
13. For an anecdotal and statistical description of the extent of the federal
agencies' environmental negligence, see Douglas Pasternak, A $200 Billion Scan-
dal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 14, 1992, at 34-47. DOE and certain gov-
ernment contractors handled nuclear and other hazardous waste in startlingly
careless ways. For example, at the DOE Rocky Flats (Colo.) nuclear warhead
factory, contractors sprayed low-level radioactive and hazardous wastes into sev-
eral "ponds" with the idea that the contaminated liquids would evaporate into
the air. Id. at 40- 41.
14. Wolverton, supra note 1, at 572. States have found these agreements to
be worthless, however, because they are not legally enforceable. Id. at 573.
These states argue that civil penalties are therefore necessary in order to force
compliance by threatening the agencies with monetary loss. Id.
15. Babich, supra note 1, at 30. Not all noncompliance was intentional. For
example, DOE often could not comply with these agreements because of the
incompetence of the managers overseeing the cleanup projects, contractor
fraud, or the sheer magnitude of the pollution problem. Pasternak, supra note
13, at 36-46.
16. Wolverton, supra note 1, at 577-80. Only those states whose CWA or
RCRA permit programs have been approved by EPA retain the authority to
bring such actions. See CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (CWA provision au-
thorizing state enforcement of own requirements upon EPA approval of pro-
gram); RCRA § 3006, 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (RCRA provision authorizing state
enforcement of permit program in lieu of federal program if former is at least as
stringent as latter).
17. 426 U.S. 167 (1976). In Hancock, one of the first environmental claims
against the federal government, the Commonwealth of Kentucky brought suit
against the Department of the Army for violations of the Clean Air Act (CAA).
See id. at 183. The Supreme Court held that Kentucky could not enforce its per-
mit requirements promulgated under state CAA provisions against federal facili-
ties because Congress failed to "clear[ly] and ambiguous[ly]" waive sovereign
immunity. Id. at 182-83.
18. 426 U.S. 200 (1976) [hereinafter EPA v. Calif.]. In EPA v. Calif., the
State of California charged EPA with failure to enforce federal CWA provisions
against federal facilities. Id. at 204. The Supreme Court found that neither EPA
nor any federal facilities are required under the CWA to follow state require-
ments because: 1) Congress did not clearly waive sovereign immunity; and 2)
EPA's obligation to review state permit programs indicated no intent to subject
federal facilities to state law. Id. at 212-13.
5
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CWA or RCRA statutes.' 9 Soon after the decisions, Congress
passed amendments to both Acts possibly intending to more ex-
plicitly waive sovereign immunity for the federal government. 20
Unfortunately, the drafters of these amendments used language
permitting different interpretations of the statutes' intent. 2'
B. Sovereign Immunity: How and Why Courts Protect the
Government from Paying Penalties
American courts accepted the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity, developed in English common law, 22 by as early as 1819, in
McCullough v. Maryland.23 Whereas the doctrine originally derived
from the idea that "the king can do no wrong," 24 modern courts
normally invoke sovereign immunity to avoid satisfying individual
claims against the government that would obstruct the state's
ability to protect the general public's welfare.25 Courts primarily
wish to protect the federal treasury (or "fisc") from judgments
that would drain away needed funds.2 6 Furthermore, courts do
not wish to grant individual citizens the types of relief, such as
injunctions or heavy fines, that would "stop the government in its
tracks" by preventing effectuation of government policy directed
towards society as a whole.27
Determined to protect the federal government from unin-
19. See Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976); EPA v. Calif., 426 U.S. 200
(1976). ,
20. See Michael D. Axline et al., Stones for David's Sling: Civil Penalties in Civil
Suits Against Polluting Federal Facilities, 2J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 21-22 (citing H.R.
REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 198 (1977)). Within the CWA and RCRA
amendments' legislative history, however, there is no discussion as to whether
sovereign immunity to coercive fines or civil penalties would be waived. See id.
21. For a discussion of the various interpretations reached by courts in ex-
amining the CWA and RCRA provisions, see infra notes 38-40 and accompany-
ing text.
22. Axline et al., supra note 20, at 17 n.81.
23. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Chief Justice Marshall relied on the
Supremacy Clause in Article VI, Paragraph 2, of the Federal Constitution to find
that the federal government is supreme over the states and therefore is not sub-
ject to state laws without its consent. Id. at 426.
24. Axline et al., supra note 20, at 17 n.81.
25. Hocking, supra note 6, at 204-05.
26. Hocking, supra note 6, at 204-05; see also Lt. Col. Richard E. Lotz, Federal
Facility Provisions of Environmental Statutes: Waiver of Sovereign Immunity for "Require-
ments "and Fines and Penalties, 31 A.F. L. REV. 7 (1989). The author's major asser-
tion is that permitting fines against federal facilities is a dangerous policy
because those penalties deprive the government of the funds necessary to clean
up facilities. He emphasizes that the agencies are underfunded already and that
allowing state or individual suits against the government for penalties would
appropriate funds from the agencies without Congress' approval. Id.
27. See Hocking, supra note 6, at 204-05. Furthermore, there is the fear that
6
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tended liability, the Supreme Court has often cited the rule that
legislative acts purporting to grant citizens the right to civil relief
from the federal government must be unambiguous and unequiv-
ocal. 28 The Court construes such waivers strictly in favor of the
state or federal government and will "not enlarge[] [them] be-
yond what the language [of the statute] requires." 29 Some Court
decisions have tempered the severity of this analysis by positing
that, although the sovereign should receive the benefit of all
doubt as to statutory waiver provisions, construction of the stat-
utes should be "fair" 30 and should not limit the scope of the
waiver that the legislature intended.3' In several instances, how-
ever, the Court has been criticized for ignoring the latter line of
decisions as its strict analysis has led to some unsavory
outcomes32
undue judicial involvement in government dealings would also cause the same
result. Id.
This argument, however, raises the question of what "government" must
not be stopped in its tracks. If "government" includes Congress, passage of
immunity waivers would appear to be voluntary and knowing stoppages. Id.
28. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. United States Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512
(1984); Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & School Lands, 461 U.S. 273
(1983); Canadian Aviator v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945). The doctrine is
eroding, however, in certain areas of law, such as tort claims. See Milstein, supra
note 1, at 129 n.40.
29. See, e.g., McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951) ("[W]aivers
of immunity must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign") (citing United
States v. Michel, 282 U.S. 656, 659 (1931)); Eastern Transp. Co. v. United
States, 272 U.S. 675 (1927) ("[W]aivers should not be enlarge[d] . . . beyond
what the language requires.").
30. Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686 (1983). A "fair" reading
would also be the "most natural" one. Id.; see also Gwaltney of Smithfield v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987).
31. See Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 111 S. Ct. 453, 457 (1990) (Rehnquist,
C.J., plurality opinion); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979)
(citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1955)). In
Franchise Tax Bd. v. United States Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 521 (1984), the
Court remarked that it should not embark upon a line of reasoning that "seek[s]
any hint of ambiguity that can be used to twist the statute into denying sovereign
immunity," but should instead seek to effectuate the underlying congressional
policy when interpreting the scope of immunity waivers; see also Canadian Avia-
tor v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 222 (1945) (stating that waivers should not be
"thwarted by an unduly restrictive interpretation").
32. In United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1019-21
(19 9 2), Justice Stevens condemned the Court's "love affair" with sovereign im-
munity. He stated that "[t]he cost to litigants, to the legislature, and to the pub-
lic at large, of this sort ofjudicial lawmaking is substantial and unfortunate [and]
its impact on individual citizens engaged in litigation against the sovereign is
tragic." Id. at 1020-21; see also William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Stat-
utoy Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 409-10 (1991) (criticizing Court
decisions forcing Congress to revise Education of the Handicapped Act of 1975
three times "to achieve its original goal"); Hocking, supra note 6, at 229.
1993] 369
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C. Judicial Confusion Over the CWA and RCRA Waiver
Provisions
In response to increasing instances of federal environmental
irresponsiblity, 33 many states sought legal remedies under the
CWA and RCRA citizen suit and federal facilities provisions in or-
der to force federal compliance with state CWA and RCRA re-
quirements. 34 These states read the federal provisions to permit
state and federal courts to assess civil penalties against federal
agencies for their past noncompliance with state laws. 35 States
argued that such penalties were necessary if they were to effec-
tively bring federal agencies into line with their federally-ap-
proved CWA and RCRA requirements.3 6 By making an example
of one or several agencies through attacks on their budgets, states
hoped to persuade other agencies to comply with those
requirements.3 7
Federal district courts and circuit courts confronted with
these state suits and with the poorly-drafted waiver provisions
33. By the late 1980's, the federal compliance rate with state CWA and
RCRA requirements was far below that of private polluters. For example, 63%
of federal facilities had violated RCRA compared to only a 38% violation rate in
private facilities. S. REF. No. 67, supra note 1, at 3.
34. For a list of cases involving state claims, see H.R. REP. No. 11, supra
note 1, at 5, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1291. California appears to be the
most active state in bringing these actions. See id.
The Ohio Court itself noted the impact of civil penalties on federal agencies'
desire to comply with state law: "To be sure, an agency of the Government may
break the law where it might have complied voluntarily if it had faced the pros-
pect of punitive fines for past violations." Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1638.
35. See, e.g., Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1633; Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air Force,
903 F.2d 1293, 1295 (10th Cir. 1990).
36. State enforcement agencies are the only entities capable of bringing
about federal facilities' compliance. Babich, supra note 1, at 32. The United
States Justice Department forbids EPA to bring suit against federal agencies be-
cause of the "unitary executive" theory. Id. This theory suggests that suits by
one branch of the executive department against another are worthless as they
entail one branch of government suing itself. Id. "(W]hen a federal facility vio-
lates an environmental statute. . . all EPA can do is attempt to cajole the recalci-
trant agency into compliance, an action which history has proved to have little
impact on agency behavior." Rothmel, supra note 10, at 582.
37. Wolverton, supra note 1, at 576. The federal government apparently
has found the threat of civil penalties to be an effective way to gain state agen-
cies' compliance with federal requirements. A congressional study shows that
90% of environmental claims by EPA against states included requests for penal-
ties. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 141, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 39 (1989)).
States normally asked for penalties because of their "motivational potential
rather than the revenues they generate." Hocking, supra note 6, at 225 (refer-
ring to small amounts in fines requested by some states). In fact, RCRA's civil
penalties section requires those fines to go to the United States Treasury. See
RCRA § 3008(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a).
8
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reached differing conclusions as to whether the CWA or RCRA
provisions effectively waived federal sovereign immunity. 38 Much
of this judicial confusion arose from the uncertain language of the
CWA and RCRA provisions,3 9 and from the ambiguous legislative
history behind the 1977 amendments. 40 The various analytical
methods with which courts attacked the statutes reflects this puz-
zlement; some focused on legislative history while others simply
analyzed the bare statutory language. 41 At best, the lower court
decisions on sovereign immunity waivers under the CWA and
38. Some courts focused on the language in the federal facilities provisions
ordering the federal government to comply with all state "substantive and pro-
cedural requirements." See Colorado v. United States Dep't of Army, 707 F.
Supp. 1562 (D. Colo. 1989) (finding waivers); California v. Walters,- 751 F.2d
977 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding no waivers); Florida Dep't of Envtl. Regulation v.
Silvex Corp., 606 F. Supp. 159 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (finding no waivers). Other
courts held that the CWA and RCRA citizen suit sections permitted states or
other parties to sue the federal government for civil penalties. See Sierra Club v.
Lujan, 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S.Ct. 1927 (1992) (finding
waiver in CWA citizen suit and federal facilities provisions); Ohio v. United
States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding waivers in CWA
federal facilities and RCRA citizen suit provisions); California v. United States
Dep't of Navy, 845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding waiver of sovereign immu-
nity permits only EPA Administrator to seek civil penalties under citizen suit
provisions). On the other extreme, several courts held that no section's lan-
guage unambiguously imparted a waiver. See Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air
Force, 903 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding no waiver in RCRA federal facili-
ties section); Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding no
waiver in any part of CWA or RCRA); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v.
Department of Navy, 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (finding no waivers in
either CWA or RCRA); Meyer v. United States Coast Guard, 644 F. Supp. 221
(E.D.N.C. 1986).
39. As the opinion in McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation stated, the stat-
utes' language can be described as a "compilation of ambiguity." McClellan Eco-
logical Seepage Situation, 655 F. Supp. at 604.
40. See Maine v. Department of Navy, 702 F. Supp. 322, 334-35 (D. Me.
1988), vacated, 973 F.2d 1001 (1st Cir. 1992) (legislative history of environmen-
tal laws yields little insight to issue of civil penalties in RCRA). But see Ohio v.
United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 1990) (waiver of
sovereign immunity consistent with "underlying congressional policy of [RCRA]
to eliminate the unsafe disposal of hazardous wastes").
Some commentators have argued that the legislative history behind the
Clean Air Act (CAA) amendments that were passed at the same time as the CWA
and RCRA amendments should indicate Congress' intent to waive sovereign im-
munity to civil penalties in all three statutes. See, e.g., Axline et al., supra note 20,
at 28. However, at least one court has refused to "bootstrap" the legislative
history of the CAA to the CWA. See McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v.
Department of Navy, 655 F. Supp. 601, 605 (E.D. Cal. 1986). No other court
has made the connection, although one analyzed the similarity in the Acts' his-
tory without passing judgment as to whether the similarities were conclusive. See
Sierra Club v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 1421, 1427-28 (10th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S.
Ct. 1927 (1992) (finding waivers evident in statutory language alone).
41. See Hocking, supra note 6, at 222, 228.
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RCRA were "erratic." 4 2
The wide disparity of the lower courts' conclusions failed to
ease the tension between the federal government 43 and states
seeking to enforce their environmental laws. Looking to settle
the conflicts, the Supreme Court decided to review the Sixth Cir-
cuit's conclusion that waivers to sovereign immunity were present
in both the CWA and RCRA. 44
III. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY V. OHIO
A. Discussion
In United States Department of Energy v. Ohio,45 the Supreme
Court elected to determine whether the citizen suit or federal fa-
cilities sections of either the CWA or RCRA waived sovereign im-
munity for the federal government.46 According to its tradition,
the Court promised to "construe [the provisions] strictly in favor
of the sovereign" without enlarging the waivers beyond what the
language of the statutes require.47
42. Id. at 228.
43. Although the federal government settled a claim made by the Fernald
plant's neighbors for $78 million, "[t]he government is less willing to make a
payout in [this case] because of the precedent" that would permit other states to
bring similar actions against federal agencies. Fernald Toxic Waste Case Goes Before
U.S. Supreme-Court, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 2, 1991, at 2B (Associated Press
report).
44. The Sixth Circuit held that the CWA federal facilities section and the
RCRA citizen suit section both allowed federal agencies to be subject to civil
penalties. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990).
For a detailed discussion of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning, see generally Shields,
supra note 7.
45. 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
46. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1632-33. The Court consolidated Ohio's petition
asking for reversal of the Sixth Circuit's decision finding no waiver in the RCRA
federal facilities section and DOE's petition asking for reversal of the lower
court's finding of waivers in the CWA federal facilities section. Id. at 1633; see
also Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1990).
The Sixth Circuit did not consider the CWA citizen suit section as it felt that its
ruling on the federal facilities section obviated the need for such analysis. Id.
47. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1633 (citing Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States,
272 U.S. 675, 686 (1927)).
The Court did not consider any legislative history or possible statutory in-
tent beyond the actual language of the provisions. Cf Maine v. United States
Dep't of Navy, 702 F. Supp. 322 (D. Me. 1988), vacated, 973 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir.
1992) (examining legislative history of RCRA). The only reference to such con-
siderations was to reject Ohio's argument that the amendments were meant to
solidify waivers of sovereign immunity for all fines. See Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1640
n.17.
In situations where there is ambiguous text and unhelpful legislative his-
tory, the Court will implement canons of statutory interpretation that reflect
traditional policy preferences. Eskridge, supra note 32, at 374. The political
10
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1. CWA and RCRA Citizen Suit Provisions
The Court considered both Acts' citizen suit provisions to-
gether because of the strong similarity of their language. 48 Con-
ceding that the sections authorized civil penalties against a
noncomplying polluter, the Court focused its attention on
whether Congress clearly subjected the federal government to
such sanctions. 49
In its analysis, the Court concentrated on what it perceived to
be ambiguity with regard to the definition of "person" created by
the incorporation of each statute's civil penalties section into each
statute's citizen suit section.50 Although both the CWA and
RCRA citizen suit sections explicitly include the United States as
a "person" subject to civil penalties, the Court found that neither
views of the justices therefore are important, as the policy tack they choose may
determine the interpretation the Court reaches. Id. Congress, however, would
prefer readings that reflect its policy choices. Id. at 375.
48. See Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1633-34. The citizen suit provision of the CWA
reads:
Any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including the United States . . .) who is
alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under
this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with
respect to such a standard or limitation ....
The district courts shall have jurisdiction ... to enforce an effluent
standard or limitation, or such order . . . as the case may be, and to
apply any appropriate civil penalties under [33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)].
CWA § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
The RCRA provision reads:
(a) In general .... [Any person may commence a civil action on
his own behalf-
(1)(A) against any person (including... the United States... ) who
is alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condi-
tion, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effective
pursuant to this Act .... or
(B) against any person, including the United States . . . who has
contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling,
storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazard-
ous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to health or the environment .... The district court shall have
jurisdiction . . . to enforce the permit, standard, regulation, require-
ment, prohibition, or order, referred to in paragraph (1)(A), to restrain
any person . . . and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under [42
U.S.C. § 6928(a) and (g)].
RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972.
The only important difference between the two is that RCRA requires that
the fines be paid to the United States. See id. § 6928(a).
49. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1634 ("It is undisputed that each civil-penalties pro-
vision authorizes fines of the punitive sort.").
50. Id. The CWA civil penalties provision is at CWA § 309(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(d). The RCRA civil penalties provision is at RCRA § 3008(a), (g), 42
U.S.C. § 6928(a), (g).
19931 373
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statute's civil penalties section makes that incorporation. 5' Rely-
ing on rules of statutory construction, 52 the Court asserted that
the incorporation of the civil penalties sections into the citizen
suit sections brings into the latter section the former's definition
of "person."53 The Court then found that the definition of "per-
son" in the civil penalties sections lay within the statutes' general
definitions of the term; neither the CWA nor RCRA general defi-
nitions of the term, however, explicitly includes the United States
as a "person." 54
The Court then concluded that the citizen suit sections per-
mit only coercive sanctions to be imposed'upon the federal gov-
ernment. The Court based its findings on the sections' inclusion
of the United States as a "person" within the sections' first
sentences, wherein only coercive fines are listed. 55 Distinguishing
the citizen suit sections from other provisions which define "per-
son" as applying to an entire section, 56 the Court inferred that
Congress did not intend to subject the federal government to civil
penalties. The Court viewed Congress' failure to expressly in-
clude the United States as a "person" throughout each entire citi-
zen suit section as extending the immunity waivers only to the
coercive penalties listed in the first sentences and not to the civil
penalties referred to in the second sentences. 57
2. CWA Federal Facilities Section
The Court next examined the CWA federal facilities section 58
and again found Congress to have authorized only coercive pen-
51. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1634.
52. Id. The rule applied was that the adoption of an earlier statute by refer-
ence "makes it as much a part of the later act as though it had been incorporated
at full length." Id. (citing Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 38 (1926)).
53. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1634-35.
54. Id. at 1635. The CWA general definition of "person" includes "an indi-
vidual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or
political subdivision of a State or any interstate body." CWA § 502(5), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(5). The RCRA provision defines "person" similarly, except that it in-
cludes "joint stock company" and "government corporation." RCRA
§ 1004(15), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15).
55. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1635.
56. The Court referred to several sections of the CWA and RCRA where
Congress defined "person" "[flor the purpose of this subsection" or in similar
language. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1635 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(7), (8) and 42
U.S.C. § 6991(6)).
57. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1635. For the text of the CWA and RCRA citizen suit
sections, see supra note 48.
58. CWA § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
12
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alties to be assessed against the federal government. 59 The ma-
jority's reasoning focused on Congress' vague use of the term
"sanctions" and the phrase subjecting the federal government to
"civil penalties arising under Federal law." 60
The Court first examined the submission of the federal gov-
ernment to "any process and sanctions" by "Federal, State, or
local courts, or in any other manner." 6' The majority believed
the definition of "sanctions" to be "spacious" enough to create
confusion as to whether Congress intended punitive and/or coer-
cive fines. 62 Looking to the term's context, the Court reasoned
that the grammatical linkage of "sanctions" to "process" implied
that the fines were to be imposed for procedural reasons, such as
contempt of a court order.63 Furthermore, the majority found a
material distinction between "substantive requirements" which,
according to the statute, are not to be enforced by courts, and
"process and sanctions," which courts shall administer.64 The
Court took this distinction to mean that Congress used "sanc-
tions" in its procedural meaning, thus excluding punitive (or
"substantive") fines from the immunity waivers. 65
After resolving the "sanctions" issue, the Court considered
whether the last clause in the federal facilities section was an un-
ambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity. 66 The majority initially
59. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1636-37.
60. Id.
61. The relevant portions of the CWA federal facilities section read:
Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the... Federal Govern-
ment ... shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, inter-
state, and local requirements, administrative authority, and process and
sanctions respecting the control and abatement of water pollution in
the same manner.., as any nongovernmental entity .... The preced-
ing sentence shall apply (A) to any requirement whether substantive or
procedural (including any recordkeeping or reporting requirement, any
requirement respecting permits and any other requirement, whatso-
ever), (B) to the exercise of any Federal, State or local administrative
authority, and (C) to any process and sanction, whether enforced in
Federal, State, or local courts or in any other manner . . . . [T]he
United States shall be liable only for those civil penalties arising under
Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to enforce an order or
the process of such court.
CWA § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
62. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1636.
63. Id. at 1637.
64. Id. at 1636-37.
65. Id.
66. The clause reads, "the United States shall be liable only for those civil
penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to en-
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recognized as apparent a waiver of immunity to substantive fines,
as the clause subjects the United States to "civil penalties arising
under Federal law." 67 However, the Court harkened back to its
analysis of the CWA citizen suit section 68 and asserted that the
CWA civil penalties section was the only applicable federal law
under which civil penalties could arise. 69 Having already found
that section inapplicable to the United States, the Court reasoned
that the "arising under" clause of the federal facilities section also
could not encompass the federal government. 70
The Court next addressed Ohio's argument that the CWA-
authorized state statute prescribing penalties against the United
States arises under federal law. 71 The majority pointed out two
cases from the 1930's, Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian,72
and International Bridge Company v. New York, 73 which held that such
statutes do not arise under federal law even though they are "ex-
pressly permitted" by congressional acts.74 The Court found it
"likely" that Congress adopted those cases' narrow interpretation
of the "arising under" language and did not intend Ohio's under-
standing of the law.75 Conversely, the majority rejected Ohio's
contention that Congress had relied on cases expansively inter-
preting language similar to the "arising under" clause of Article
III of the United States Constitution. 76 The Court emphasized
67. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1638.
68. For a discussion of the Court's CWA citizen suit and civil penalties sec-
tions analysis, see supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
69. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1638.
70. Id. at 1638.
71. See id.
72. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
73. 254 U.S. 126 (1920).
74. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1638-39. In Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian,
299 U.S. 109, 116 (1936), the Court found that a suit over state taxation of a
nationally chartered bank did not "arise under federal law" even if that taxation
occurred only because of federal statutory authority. In International Bridge
Co. v. New York, 254 U.S. 126, 133 (1920), the Court found that the construc-
tion of a bridge by a state-chartered company did not "arise under federal law"
even though Congress authorized that construction. Id.
75. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1639 (citing ICC v. Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270,
284-85 (1987)).
76. Id. at 1639 n.16. The Arising Under Clause provides that the federal
judicial power shall extend to "all Cases ... arising under [the] Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made ... under their Authority ... [and
to] Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens, or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. III.
Other Supreme Court decisions regarding the Article III, "arising under"
language have given that phrase a broad meaning. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v.
Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983). In Verlinden, the Court posited
that its previous decisions reflect a "broad conception of [the "arising under"
14
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that the precedents requiring narrow construction foreclosed ac-
ceptance of any interpretation in favor of a waiver if a contrary
reading could also be reached. 77
The majority then had to dispose of the "arising under"
clause that, because of the Court's analysis, appeared devoid of
meaning.78 The majority could not give the phrase any logical
effect within the statute and dismissed it as a probable drafting
error.79 In any event, the inconsistency did not appear to trouble
the Court as it sought out only clear, unambiguous waivers of sov-
ereign immunity.8 0
B. Analysis: A Tortured Statutory Construction
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Ohio is a vivid example of
the lengths to which the Court will go in order to circumvent sov-
ereign immunity waivers. Justice Souter's refined and, perhaps,
hair-splitting statutory analysis avoided any plain meaning that
the CWA and RCRA provisions may have held. In doing so, how-
ever, the majority may have crossed the analytical threshold from
narrow construction into an "overly ingenuous" interpretation of
facially clear, although poorly-drafted, statutes."' Moreover, the
Court did not insist upon a "fair" reading of the statutes that
would not limit the scope of the waivers that Congress in-
tended. 82 Instead, the majority produced an intricate interpreta-
clause] according to which Congress may confer on the federal courts jurisdic-
tion over any case or controversy that might call for the application of federal
law." Id. at 492 (interpreting Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 U.S. (Wheat.)
738 (1824)).
77. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1639.
78. See id. ("The question is still what Congress could have meant in using a
seemingly expansive phrase like 'civil penalties arising under Federal law'
[t]he question has no satisfactory answer.").
79. Id.
80. See id. For a discussion of the Court's adoption of the narrow construc-
tion rule, see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
81. See Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1642 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White's opin-
ion, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, criticized the majority's reasoning
on every point but that of the RCRA federal facilities provision. See id. at 1642-
44. The thesis of his criticism is that the majority did not determine what the
statutes actually said but rather found that the statutes should have been drafted
more artfully. Id. at 1644. He finds the waivers in all sections but the RCRA
federal facilities provision to be clear on their face. See id. at 1642-44.
82. See Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 520 (1991) (O'Connor, J.)
("[O]nce Congress has waived sovereign immunity over certain subject matter,
the Court should be careful not to 'assume the authority to narrow the waiver
that Congress intended.' ") (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118
(1979)); Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685-86 (1983) (stating that
15
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tion which may not appear self-evident from the statutory text
and which may have subverted Congress' intent.
Perhaps the most striking example of the Court's tortured
analysis is its disposal of the CWA and RCRA citizen suit sec-
tions. 83 There, the Court relied on certain rules of statutory con-
struction 4 to conclude that the civil penalties sections' definition
(and general statutory definitions) of "person" are incorporated
into the citizen suit provisions.
The Court ignored extensions or opposites of these con-
struction rules that appear equally well-accepted.8 5 One such
rule states that a statute of reference incorporates the provisions
referred to from the incorporated statute without subsequent
amendments, unless the legislature has expressly or by strong im-
plication shown its intention to include subsequent amendments
with the incorporated statute.8 6 Arguably, Congress' inclusion of
the United States within the citizen suit provisions' definitions of
"person" would amend the term's definitions in any statute, in-
cluding the civil penalties sections, incorporated into those provi-
sions. In light of Congress' plausible intent to expand the
sovereign immunity waivers by amending the CWA and RCRA,
the initial inclusion of the United States could represent a strong
indication of Congress' desire to subject the federal government
to all civil penalties language in the entire section.8 7
Another general rule of statutory construction that the Court
did not consider is that in a statute of specific reference a court
may consider only the appropriate parts of the statute alluded to
courts should not expand waiver beyond what a "fair" reading of statute
requires).
While reciting the various rules of interpretation of sovereign immunity
waivers, the Court did not mention any of the cases calling for a fair reading of
the provisions in question. See Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1633. For a discussion of such
cases, see supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
83. For a discussion of the Court's analysis of the CWA and RCRA citizen
suit provisions, see supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
84. The Court relied not only on its own case law but also on the rules of
statutory construction collected in 2A-B NORMANJ. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION (5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION]. See Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1634.
85. See SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 84, at § 51.08.
86. See id. (citing Curtis Ambulance of Fla., Inc. v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 811 F.2d -1371, 1378 (10th Cir. 1987)); EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 546
F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Mich. 1982), aff'd, 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1984).
87. For a discussion of Congress' amendments to the CWA and RCRA pro-
visions, see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
16
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol4/iss2/4
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY V. OHIO
by the referring statute.8 8 By applying this rule, the Court could
have found that the citizen suit sections refer only to those "appro-
pnate civil penalties" that are listed within the civil penalties sec-
tions.8 9 If the citizen suit sections were found to make specific
reference to those potential civil penalties and not to the "per-
son" definitions, the definitions would not be relevant to the citi-
zen suit sections. The citizen suit penalties thus would
incorporate those "appropriate" penalties and no other statutory
language. 90
.The Court's selective use of construction rules continued in
its analysis of the CWA federal facilities section. 9 1 After deter-
mining that the term "sanctions" does not convey any plain
meaning, the Court found that the term could mean either coer-
cive fines or punitive penalties; according to the Court, "sanc-
tions" could not entail both forms of fines. 92
While "sanctions" could imply that Congress intended "co-
ercive fines," the term could also plainly denote "punitive fines"
or "penalties." The Supreme Court and other authorities consid-
ering the issue have found "sanctions" to include both coercive
and punitive fines. 93 The Court may have ignored the plain
meaning rule by holding that "sanctions" has a narrower mean-
88. See SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 84, at § 51.08
(citing Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
89. See CWA § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (emphasis added); see also CWA
§ 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (CWA civil penalties section).
*90. In determining the "appropriate" civil penalties listed in the CWA civil
penalties section, a court may consider such factors as "the seriousness of the
violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the viola-
tions, any history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the
applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator,
and such other matters as justice may require." CWA § 309(d), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(d). The "appropriate" civil penalties listed in the RCRA provision are
those issued after the EPA Administrator has "take[n] into account the serious-
ness of the violation and any good faith efforts to comply with applicable re-
quirements." RCRA § 3008(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3).
91. For a discussion of the Court's analysis, see supra notes 58-80 and ac-
companying text.
92. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1636-37.
93. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484
U.S. 49, 53 (1987) (civil penalties authorized by CWA may be "sanctions");
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249, (1980); Sierra Club v. Lujan, 931 F.2d
1421, 1425-26 (10th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 1927 (1992).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "sanction" as a "[p]enalty or other mecha-
nism of enforcement used to provide incentives for obedience with the law or
with rules and regulations [or] [t]hat part of a law which is designed to secure
enforcement by imposing a penalty for its violation or offering a reward for its
observance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1341 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
1993] 379
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ing than that ordinarily employed.94 However, defining "sanc-
tions" as including punitive penalties would have nullified the
Court's argument that Congress meant to expose the federal gov-
ernment only to coercive, procedure-based fines.
The Court's analysis of the final sentence of the section ap-
pears particularly flawed. 95 As the majority acknowledged, the
language is "troublesome" to an analysis resistant to finding a
waiver;96 the sentence apparently subjects the United States to
"those civil penalties arising under Federal law."' 97 The Court
avoided a waiver by indicating that its CWA citizen suit analysis
revealed no basis for imposing civil penalties on the federal gov-
ernment under the only applicable federal law, the CWA. 98
In so concluding, the Court failed to give the clause any
forceful effect within the statute. 99 This holding contravenes an
established rule of statutory construction noted in the Court's
own analysis. Earlier in the opinion, the Court strove to meet
"the test of giving effect to all the language of the citizen-suit sec-
tions."' 00 In its "arising under" analysis, however, the majority
failed to give an entire sentence any effect whatsoever and dis-
missed the language as a likely drafting error.10' If the Court had
accepted Ohio's contention that Congress used the language
within the context of Article III of the United States Constitu-
94. There is a "strong presumption" that the legislative purpose is ex-
pressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct.
515, 520 (1991). This presumption is lifted only in "rare and exceptional cir-
cumstances" when a contrary congressional intent is "clearly expressed." Id.; see
also Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 600-01 (1963)
(courts should not defeat congressional intent by narrowing scope of waivers).
95. The final sentence of the federal facilities section reads: "The United
States shall be liable only for those civil penalties arising under Federal law or
imposed by a State or local court to enforce an order or the process of such
court." CWA § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
96. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1638.
97. CWA § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
98. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1638-39. For a discussion of the Court's analysis of
this section, see supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
99. See Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1643 (White,J., dissenting) ("The Court acknowl-
edges that its distortion of the statute leaves the phrase . . . devoid of
meaning.").
100. Id. at 1635 ("This textual analysis passes the test of giving effect to all
the language of the citizen-suit sections."); see also Crandon v. United States, 494
U.S. 152, 171 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985); F.A.A. Admin'r v. Robertson, 422 U.S.
255, 261 (1975); Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 633
(1973).
101. See Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1639.
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tion, 102 or as a reasonable description of the "cooperative feder-
alism" structure of the CWA, 03 it would have given the sentence
effect. However, a waiver of sovereign immunity to civil penalties
necessarily would follow from that conclusion, as there would be
a "federal law" basis for a waiver independent of the CWA citizen
suit provision.
Moreover, the majority may have unrealistically attributed to
Congress an understanding of the Court's construction of the
phrase "arising under Federal law" in Gully v. First National Bank
in Meridian.1 4 In general, Congress has closely monitored
Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes over the past
few decades. 05 The Ohio Court, however, imputed to Congress
knowledge of an interpretation which has appeared in only two
cases, each almost sixty years old. 10 6 The Court's presumption
102. For a discussion of the Article III language and the Court's analysis of
Ohio's argument, see supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text. The Court in
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492-93 (1983), held
that, at its broadest, the Arising Under Clause may permit " 'assertion of origi-
nal federal jurisdiction on the remote possibility of presentation of a federal ques-
tion.'" Id. (quoting Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 482 (1957)(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added)). Since the federal CWA and
RCRA require states to implement permit programs (or face preemption by fed-
eral programs), a federal question may be remotely possible in such areas. For a
discussion of the CWA and RCRA permit programs, see supra note 10 and ac-
companying text.
103. For a discussion of the federal-state relationship behind the CWA and
RCRA, see supra note 10 and accompanying text. Because the state statutes
must meet minimum federal standards imposed by the CWA and RCRA, and
must permit suits under the federal facilities and citizen suit provisions of the
CWA and RCRA, it would appear that those state laws arise under federal law.
Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1056, 1061 (6th Cir. 1990).
The types of suits that would not arise under federal law would be those based
on state statutes that fail to meet EPA approval under the CWA. See id.
104. 299 U.S. 109 (1936). The Ohio Court relied on the holding in Gully to
find that state laws enacted because of federal authorization do not "arise
under" federal law for the purpose of the federal facilities section. See Ohio, 112
S. Ct. at 1628-39. For a discussion of the Gully holding, see supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
105. Eskridge, supra note 32, at 336. Almost half of the Court's statutory
interpretation decisions have been or will be the specific focus of legislative
hearings. Id.
106. The cases citing Gully on similar grounds discuss the more "selective
process" of defining federal courts' juridiction over federal questions. See Cater-
pillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) ("[Flederal jurisdiction exists
only when a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff's well-pleaded
complaint."); Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 811,
813 (1986) (considering "selective process" behind federal jurisdiction based on
federal questions).
A recent Court opinion held that the Court can presume congressional fa-
miliarity with common rules of statutory construction, and then factor such fa-
miliarity into its analysis of federal statutes. See McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr.,
1993]
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that Congress intended to use the Gully construction of "arising
under Federal law" therefore may not be a reasonable rebuttal to
Ohio's contention that its requirements arise under federal law.
According to its custom when grappling with this issue, the
Court chose the path of statutory analysis leading furthest away
from sovereign immunity waivers.' 0 7 The Court did not consider
any of the legislative history or possible congressional intent be-
hind the waivers.108 The majority simply examined the bare lan-
guage of the statutes in a mechanical fashion, selectively applying
rules of construction to form interpretations vulnerable to attack
by contrary rules left neglected.' 09 In the end, the Court found a
poorly-drafted statute ambiguous. The majority's line of reason-
ing, however, could find a well-drafted statute equivocal."10
IV. THE FEDERAL FACILITY COMPLIANCE ACT OF 1992
In October 1992, President Bush signed into law the Federal
Facility Compliance Act of 1992 (FFCA), an amendment to
RCRA.II Reacting to the Ohio decision, Congress enacted FFCA
to override the Court's interpretation of the RCRA federal facili-
ties section and, perhaps unintentionally, the Court's citizen suit
111 S. Ct. 888 (1991); see also Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1633 (citing McNary). The
McNary Court, however, cited a rule of statutory construction that the Court had
applied recently. McNary, Ill S. Ct. at 898 (citing Bowen v. Michigan Academy
of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)).
107. For a discussion of the Court's practice of construing waivers of sover-
eign immunity narrowly, see supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
108. Some lower courts that considered this issue have examined the legis-
lative history or other evidence of Congress' intent before attempting to con-
strue the CWA and RCRA provisions. See, e.g., Maine v. United States Dep't of
Navy, 702 F. Supp. 322 (D. Me. 1988), vacated, 973 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1992)
(examining legislative history of RCRA and finding it ambiguous as to congres-
sional intent).
109. One author has criticized the shortsighted "blind adherence" that
courts sometimes have to strict interpretation of sovereign immunity waivers.
See Hocking, supra note 6, at 229. The author urges courts to weigh long-term
effects of such restrictive readings into their analysis. Id.
110. See Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1644 (White, J, dissenting) (criticizing majority
for "imput[ing] to Congress a desire for incoherence"). Justice White sarcasti-
cally remarked during oral argument that the majority and DOE believe that
"Congress rewrote the laws to cover the federal government yet did it so subtly
that they really didn't do it?" Roger K. Lowe, Ohio Argues for Fernald Pollution,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 4, 1991, at 5D.
111. Act of Oct. 6, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106
Stat.) 1505 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6961) [hereinafter FFCA]. Congress
passed the House of Representatives' version of the bill instead of the Senate
version. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 886, 102nd Cong, 2d Sess. 18 (1992), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1287 [hereinafter H.R. CONF. REP. No. 886]. For the bill's
legislative history, see id. at 1287-1337.
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section holdings." 12 In order to enact the legislation, FFCA's pro-
ponents made some concessions to the President and his congres-
sional allies who resisted the bill on the grounds that it would
expose federal agencies to penalties they could not afford to
bear.' '3 The short-term benefits gained by DOE from these com-
promises, however, may become onerous over time as FFCA
leaves unanswered many questions as to the future relationship
between states affected by agencies' pollution and the federal
government.
A. FFCA's Structure
In unmistakable terms, but with some exceptions, FFCA
waives sovereign immunity for all federal agencies to actions
brought for any type of civil penalty under the RCRA federal fa-
cilities section."l 4 Similarly but indirectly, FFCA also abrogates
immunity for the federal government to claims brought under the
RCRA citizen suit sections by modifying the RCRA definition of
"person" to include all departments and agencies of the United
States." 5 Both waivers appear to be sufficiently clear so as to
withstand the Court's intensive inquiry." t6 In effect, FFCA per-
112. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 886, supra note 111, at 18, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1318.
113. See Federal Facilities: Congress Clears Bill to Let States, EPA Enforce RCRA
Provisions at Government Sites, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1462 (Sept. 25, 1992); Federal
Facilities: Bush Signs Federal Facilities Compliance Act Allowing RCRA Enforcement at
DOD, DOE Sites, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1546 (Oct. 9, 1992) [hereinafter Bush
Signs].
114. The amendment, to be inserted after the first sentence of the RCRA
federal facilities section (42 U.S.C. § 6961), reads in pertinent part:
The Federal, State, interstate, and local substantive and procedural re-
quirements referred to in this subsection include ... all civil and ad-
ministrative penalties and fines, regardless of whether such penalties or
fines are punitive or coercive in nature.... The United States hereby
expressly waives any immunity otherwise applicable to the United
States with respect to any such substantive or procedural requirement
(including... any injunctive relief, administrative order or civil or ad-
ministrative penalty or fine ... ).
FFCA § 102(a)(3), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 1505.
115. FFCA § 103, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 1507. The amendment
changes the RCRA "person" definition (42 U.S.C. § 6903(15)) to include "each
department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States." Id.
The Supreme Court had refused to find a waiver because the original RCRA
definition did not include the United States, thus excluding the federal govern-
ment from the civil penalties section. See Ohio, 112 S.Ct. at 1633-36. For a dis-
cussion of the Court's analysis, see supra note 48-57, 84-91, and accompanying
text.
116. For a discussion of the Court's analysis of the CWA and RCRA sec-
tions, see supra notes 48-57, 83-91, and accompanying text.
1993] 383
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mits EPA, states, and any citizen to sue the federal government
for noncompliance with RCRA requirements and to expect courts
to impose punitive penalties." 17
The FFCA exceptions, however, give federal agencies a
three-year grace period from civil penalties if their facilities are
handling "mixed waste," a combination of nuclear and any other
hazardous waste." i 8 DOE in particular" 9 is exempt from civil
penalties until the end of that period; during that time, that
agency must formulate compliance plans describing how it in-
tends to meet with state or federal RCRA requirements. 20 If a
state has the authority under RCRA to establish its own hazard-
ous waste requirements,' 2 1 it alone has the power to approve or
disapprove the plan; neither EPA nor any other branch of the fed-
eral government may intercede. 2 2 Should a state disapprove a
plan, it is then free to sue DOE for civil penalties provided that
117. Bush Signs, supra note 113, at 1546. The explicit grant of authority to
enforce RCRA against its fellow agencies may run afoul of the Justice Depart-
ment's view that the "unitary executive" theory makes such intra-branch en-
forcement unlawful. See Babich, supra note 1, at 32 (explaining enforcement
problems caused by theory).
118. FFCA § 102(c)(2), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 1506 (per-
taining to delayed effective date of sovereign immunity waiver). Congress in-
cluded the three-year delay because DOE claimed the period "both necessary
and adequate" to develop the plans. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 886, supra note 111,
at 21, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1321.
FFCA also amends 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (RCRA definitions section) to include
the term "mixed waste," defined as "waste that contains both hazardous waste
and source, special nuclear, or by-product material subject to the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.)." FFCA § 105(b), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 1512.
119. DOE was singled out from other federal agencies because its control
over the most dangerous radioactive sites put it in a "unique situation[]." Bush
Signs, supra note 113, at 1546.
120. FFCA § 102(c)(3)(B), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 1506-
07. DOE formulation and submission of compliance plans is covered under
FFCA § 105(a). See id. at 1508-12. DOE must first submit to EPA and to each
affected state an inventory of all mixed wastes generated by DOE and of all
mixed waste treatment capacities and technologies. Id. at 1508 (to be codified as
42 U.S.C. § 6940(a)). The agency must then develop a plan under which it will
clean up those facilities currently generating or backlogged with mixed waste.
Id. at 1510 (to be codified as 42 U.S.C. § 6940(b)(1)). The plan must include
schedules demonstrating when each step in the cleanup process (including ap-
plying for permits, entering into contracts, and commencing operation) will oc-
cur and when new treatment technologies will be developed. Id. (to be codified
as 42 U.S.C. § 6940(b)(l)(B)).
121. For a discussion of how states may become eligible to enact RCRA
requirements that can replace federal regulation, see supra note 10 and accom-
panying text.
122. FFCA § 105(a) (to be codified as 42 U.S.C. § 6940(b)(2)(A)), reprinted
in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 1510. When reviewing the submitted DOE
plan, a state is required only to consult with EPA. Id.
22
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the three-year period has expired. 23 If the period has not ex-
pired, the state may still petition a court for coercive penalties, as
FFCA's legislative history indicates that those penalties will con-
tinue to exist within RCRA. 124
Once it submits an approved compliance plan, DOE is sub-
ject to civil penalties only for violations of that plan and not for
violations of state RCRA requirements. 25 Any civil penalties re-
ceived by states under FFCA for violation of compliance plans
must be directed towards improvement or protection of those
states' environment. 126 According to the House committee re-
port on FFCA, the source of these penalties is to be DOE appro-
priations if the agency admits to a violation; if the agency denies
wrongdoing, however, the Federal Judgment Fund, not DOE,
would pay the penalties. 27
B. Analysis
In general, FFCA appears to be a rational partial solution to
the DOE-DOD environmental quagmire. The amendment grants
DOE time to coordinate and commence cleanups while it threat-
ens the agency with liability should it fail to submit a plan to a
particular state's satisfaction or should it violate a state-approved
plan. Since DOE claims it is unable to initiate cleanups within the
near future, FFCA may provide for a fairer and more realistic
timetable than if states were permitted to ask for civil penalties
immediately. 28 Apparently, both states and DOE are satisfied;
123. FFCA § 102(c)(3)(B), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 1507
(DOE exempted from civil penalties only if plan has been approved by state
under RCRA § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 6940).
124. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 886, supra note 111, at 21, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1321.
125. FFCA § 102(c)(3)(B), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 1507.
FFCA also permits only prospective use of civil penalties; the House Conference
Report indicates that the waiver is not intended to have retroactive effect. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 886, supra note 111, at 18, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1318.
126. FFCA § 102(b), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 1506 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6961(c)).
127. See H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 1, at 15, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1301 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 1304 as authority forJudgment Fund ap-
propriation). The report relies on a Comptroller General decision with regard
to the Clean Air Act civil penalties. The reporting House committee also states
that such a system would provide for agency accountability due to congressional
oversight over theJudgment Fund. Id. But see Cheng, supra note 1, at 865 (struc-
ture of payments would permit agencies to "pass the buck" ofjudgment liability
to Judgment Fund).
128. For example, DOE has stated that the Fernald cleanup will take six
years to complete at a cost of $2.9 billion to United States taxpayers. Roger K.
Lowe, Court Says Federal Government Can't Be Fined for Pollution Mess at Fernald Plant,
19931
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states have veto power over plan formulation and may collect civil
penalties for future violations of approved schemes while DOE
receives a reprieve from past and present pressure from states to
comply with RCRA.129
Despite its potential effectiveness, FFCA may leave un-
resolved several important issues that could seriously affect the
federal-state relationship envisioned by Congress. First, the
amendment and its legislative history do not adequately answer
the question of how penalties, civil/punitive or proce-
dural/coercive, are to be paid. A House report claims that the
money is to come from either the Judgment Fund or agency ap-
propriations, depending on whether the agencies contest the
claims in court.13 0 Conversely, President Bush, in his signing
statement, declared that the penalties are to be paid from agency
appropriations alone; drawing them from the Judgment Fund, he
said, would "take away the coercive effect penalties might have on
the agencies and [create] a revenue sharing plan."''
Either source of payment could portend enforcement
problems for states seeking civil penalties. Taking the penalties
from the Judgment Fund would defeat Congress' intent to en-
force DOE compliance with RCRA requirements. The threat of
civil penalties would not compel DOE to follow its own compli-
ance plan because it would not feel the pain associated with mon-
etary loss. 132
On the other hand, states or EPA may receive no money at all
if the source is special congressional appropriations. In such an
event, Congress would determine on an ad hoc basis whether or
not to appropriate funds for a particular facility's debt. Although
Congress probably would approve the appropriations so as to
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 22, 1992, at IA. Recent estimates claim that cleanup
of all contaminated federal sites may cost $200 billion over the next 30 years.
Pasternak, supra note 13, at 34.
129. The National Governors Association, a strong proponent of FFCA,
was "enormously pleased" with President Bush's signing of the bill, although its
chairman had reservations about some aspects. Bush Signs, supra note 113, at
1546. The President and DOE have also registered their approval. See id.; H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 886, supra note 111, at 21, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1321.
130. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 1, at 15, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1301.
131. Statement by President George Bush upon Signing of H.R. 2194, 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1337.
132. See id. The House report on the bill, however, seems to maintain that
agencies would still be coerced by the imposition of civil penalties because of
congressional oversight of the Judgment Fund. See H.R. REP. No. 111, supra
note 1, at 15-16, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1301-02.
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meet with its own laws, the process could be time-consuming and
therefore frustrating to states seeking either satisfaction of their
judgments or, more importantly, the coerced agency compliance.
Moreover, Congress may simply disapprove the appropriations,
thus leaving the liable agencies "judgment-proof" against states'
claims for civil penalties. 33
Another problem left unresolved by FFCA is the continued
lack of waivers of sovereign immunity within the CWA. Congress
did not extend the FFCA sovereign immunity waivers to the
CWA, thus leaving in place only the waivers to coercive penalties
found by the Ohio Court. I3 4 Although the dangers posed by the
DOE and DOD contaminated sites are caused mainly by mishan-
dled radioactive waste subject to RCRA regulation, federal facili-
ties still fail to comply with CWA requirements two times more
often than private industry. 3 5 As a result of Congress' inatten-
tion to the CWA, those facilities are free to pollute navigable wa-
ters in violation of state permits without fear of incurring civil
penalties. While the federal radioactive waste crisis rightfully
warrants immediate congressional attention, many states would
argue that federal neglect of CWA problems is of major conse-
quence as well.' 3 6
V. IMPACT: FEDERAL MISBEHAVIOR COULD RUIN THE CWA AND
RCRA ENFORCEMENT SCHEMES
FFCA and the Ohio decision will greatly change the manner in
which states enforce their environmental laws. Although FFCA's
enactment probably will aid state enforcement of RCRA laws in
that it gives states control over cleanup planning through valida-
tion of both coercive and civil penalties, some problems may arise
that could complicate the relationship envisioned by FFCA's
drafters. Moreover, Congress' disregard of the Ohio Court's CWA
133. A National Governors' Association spokesman articulated his organi-
zation's fear of this result. However, he also indicated that states would have to
"assume that the federal government would act in good faith and honor any
judgments against it." Bush Signs, supra note 113, at 1546.
134. For a discussion of the Ohio holding, see supra notes 48-80 and accom-
panying text.
135. See Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1641 (White, J., dissenting in part) (citing United
States General Accounting Office Report).
136. Many states have expressed concern over water pollution by federal
facilities through their requests for civil penalties under the CWA. See, e.g., Ohio,
112 S. Ct. at 1632; Sierra Club v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1991), vacated,
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holding will detract from states' attempts to enforce their own
CWA requirements against federal facilities. In the end, the fed-
eral government may pay more in coercive penalties under the
CWA than it would have paid in punitive penalties.
The major catalyst for any future disputes between states and
DOE could be state environmental officials' negative attitudes to-
ward the federal government due to the latter's environmental
mismanagement. 3 7 Realization of the "cooperative federalism"
that Congress envisioned in enacting the CWA, RCRA, and FFCA
has been made exceedingly difficult by the federal government's
noncompliance with its own environmental laws.13 8 This nonfea-
sance has served to irritate and embitter those state officials who
must enforce local environmental programs and who have seen
their states ravaged by federal agencies' negligence. 3 9
Such animosity could complicate the FFCA scheme by caus-
ing states to ride roughshod over DOE activity. Under the
amendment, states have the authority to approve, disapprove, or
modify proposed DOE compliance plans 140 and to sue for puni-
tive and/or coercive penalties if a facility is not in compliance with
an approved plan. 141 However, FFCA gives states few standards
by which they must act on submitted plans; presumably, they will
have the discretion to determine what timetable for compliance
would be appropriate.142 States fearing continued federal neglect
may reject DOE proposals and insist upon even more stringent
cleanup timetables or procedures than those DOE suggests.
They may also closely monitor DOE progress on cleanups and
quickly move for civil and/or coercive penalties upon the slightest
sign of deviation from compliance plans. As a result, the federal
137. The enforcement officers of several states faced with the federal facil-
ity pollution dilemma vented their anger toward federal noncompliance with
their states' laws at a 1991 House committee hearing. See H.R. REp. No. 111,
supra note 1, at 6-12, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1292-1301. The high cost
and repeated hassle of litigating issues such as sovereign immunity under the
CWA and RCRA also have frustrated state officials. See id. at I I (testimony of
Chris Gregoire, Director, Washington State Dep't of Ecology).
138. For a discussion of the CWA and RCRA structures, see supra note 10
and accompanying text.
139. See H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 1, at 6-11, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1292-98.
140. FFCA § 105, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 1510 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6940(b)(2)(A)).
141. FFCA § 102(c)(3), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 1506-07.
142. See FFCA § 105(b), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1512 (to be codified
as 42 U.S.C. § 6902(41)). EPA will only promulgate regulations regarding ap-
propriate levels and methods of treatment of mixed waste. H.R. CONF. REP. No.
886, supra note 111, at 27, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327.
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government may have less control over the cleanup process or
may owe more penalties than Congress foresaw when considering
FFCA.
The ambiguity over the source of any judgment against DOE
could spark even more intense state action against the federal
government because of the latter's perceived bad faith.143 States
may become more suspicious should the federal government de-
lay payment of judgments due to special appropriations proceed-
ings. Likewise, Congress could frustrate the coercive nature of
the FFCA-authorized civil penalties by making them drawable
from the Judgment Fund.
Deprived of a means of forcing immediate compliance, states
may choose more radical ways of attracting Congress' attention.
Judging from officials' remarks after the restrictive Ohio decision
and FFCA's passage, anxious states are likely to bring suits "early
and often" to obtain court orders for coercive and civil penalties
against DOE.' 44 The federal government could then be subject
to mounting coercive fines as well as to civil penalties for contin-
ued noncompliance with their FFCA plans.' 45 Past claims by
many federal agencies that instant compliance with state require-
ments or fast cleanup action is impossible due to technology limi-
tations and cost may foreshadow those agencies' future difficulties
in meeting court orders.' 46 As a result of continued and unrectifi-
able noncompliance, the federal government could face coercive
and punitive fines claimed concurrently by many states on a daily
basis. 147
Any further upheaval within the sensitive RCRA arena may
then lead to greater state scrutiny of federal compliance with
CWA requirements. The Ohio decision, which divested states of
the civil-penalties weapon, and federal neglect of FFCA mandates
may increase the states' animosity toward the federal govern-
143. For a discussion of the dispute over the source of any incurred penal-
ties against federal agencies, see supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
144. See David 0. Stewart, Advantage Government: Is It Easier for the Govern-
ment to Win in the Supreme Court?, A.B.A. J., July 1992, at 49 (quoting Ohio Assis-
tant Attorney General Jack Van Kley shortly after Ohio decision announced).
Ohio already had petitioned its state courts for an injunction. Id.
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(c) (RCRA citizen suit provision); Ohio, 112 S. Ct.
at 1638 ("[I]t could be a very expensive mistake [for federal agencies] to plan on
ignoring the law indefinitely on the assumption that contumacy would be
cheap.").
146. For a discussion of the length of time DOE is likely to need in comply-
ing with RCRA, see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
147. For example, the RCRA civil penalties section authorizes imposition
of fines of up to $25,000 per day. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3).
1993]
27
May: United States Department of Energy v. Ohio & (and) the Federal Fa
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
390 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IV: p. 363
ment. 148  Furthermore, states still have the option of asking
courts for coercive penalties for federal agencies' failure to meet
with compliance orders.' 49 State officials' comments made after
the Ohio decision indicate that these hard feelings will translate
into a proliferation of requests for injunctive relief and contempt
fines brought quickly by state agencies in state' 50 or federal
courts. '51
The net adverse effect on the federal government would be
twofold. First, the agencies would have to pay coercive penalties
assessed for their failure to meet the terms of a court order.152 In
light of federal agencies' previous difficulties in complying with
state requirements, they may be subject to large fines growing at a
daily rate over an extended period of time. 153 Over the long run,
the federal government could owe more in coercive penalties
than what it would have owed in the comparatively mild punitive
penalties states had previously requested.154
148. See Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1641 (White, J., dissenting). EPA itself has testi-
fied that "penalties serve as a valuable determent to noncompliance and [] help
focus facility managers' attention on the importance of compliance with environ-
mental requirements." S. REP. No. 67, supra note 1, at 4.
149. For a discussion of the Ohio holdings, see supra notes 48-80 and ac-
companying text.
150. Although state enforcement agencies probably would prefer to bring
sanctions claims in state courts so that local biases against the polluting federal
agencies can be played upon, federal agencies have always removed such cases
to federal court. Wolverton, supra note 1, at 585.
151. See H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 1, at 6-12, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1292-98 (complaints of state environmental officials regarding de-
ficient federal environmental behavior). Before Ohio, states regarded litigation
over such matters as desirable only under the "most dire circumstances." Id. at
11. Jack A. Van Kley, the attorney who argued in front of the Supreme Court for
Ohio, summed up state officials' attitudes by predicting increased state requests
for injunctions and by commenting that "[n]egotiation [with federal agencies] is
a waste of time." Stewart, supra note 144, at IA. The aggravation caused by
increased litigation and its attendant costs probably will not serve to improve the
federal-state relationship envisioned by the CWA and RCRA. See H.R. REP. No.
111, supra note 1, at 6-12, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1292-98 (negative com-
ments of state officials regarding relationship).
152. See Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1635-40.
153. "Once punitive fines start running they can be every dollar as onerous
as their punitive counterparts .... Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1638.
154. As of 1991, 10 states had brought Ohio-type suits against federal agen-
cies for violations at 25 sites and had asked for civil penalties totalling $602,654.
H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 1, at 14, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1300-01.
By comparison, the expected cleanup costs for DOE sites alone is over $70 bil-
lion. Lowe, supra note 128, at IA. The average amount actually collected was
$5,000 per claim. Wolverton, supra note 1, at 585.
Although federal agencies may have to pay penalties, those agencies may
benefit in the long run from FFCA and state requirements that the penalties be
used for environmental restoration. See FFCA § 102(b), reprinted in 1992
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Second, federal agencies attempting to manage an orderly,
priority-based cleanup of federal facilities might lose substantial
control over their own remedial programs. Once a state acts
swiftly upon discovering federal noncompliance with state CWA
provisions and obtains a court order requiring instant compli-
ance, federal agencies will have the Hobson's choice of cleaning
up a particular area quickly or of watching coercive penalties pile
up against them. Agency discretion over prioritization of facility
cleanups will then be tempered by the fear of mounting coercive
fines and by the terms set out in the court order. 55
Before Ohio, by contrast, states could successfully browbeat
federal agencies into compliance agreements with the threat of
punitive fines. 156 Under such agreements, federal agencies were
able to gain concessions as to how and when compliance would
be reached, and frequently managed to avoid their obligations al-
together. 57 Because states do not have the inchoate ability to sue
for civil penalties under the CWA, however, they may not bother
to seek compliance agreements with the federal government as
they have been deprived of their primary enforcement weapon.
Confronted with more obstacles to CWA enforcement by the fed-
eral government, states probably will seek court orders and coer-
cive fines to ensure federal compliance with requirements. 58
The Supreme Court, through its Ohio decision, and Congress
and the President, through FFCA's enactment, therefore may
have created a situation where all parties with an interest in CWA
or RCRA enforcement lose. The federal government may have to
pay heavy and numerous coercive fines under the CWA, punitive
U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 1506 (to be codified as 42 U.S.C. § 6961(c)); Wolver-
ton, supra note 1, at 593 (citing IDAHO CODE § 39-4417B (1990); OHio REV.
CODE ANN. § 3734.13(C), (E) (Anderson 1988 & Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 10.1-1406 (Michie 1990)).
155. The federal government and its defenders raise the fear that court-
imposed penalties will wreak havoc with priority-based federal cleanup plans
during litigation with states over these issues. See Lotz, supra note 26, at 22-23.
In addition, one of the reasons behind sovereign immunity is to prevent undue
judicial interference with governmental activity; whether undue or not, such in-
terference would occur through court orders. Hocking, supra note 6, at 204-05.
156. For example, Ohio signed DOE to a compliance agreement in 1988.
Stewart, supra note 144, at 48. DOE, however, violated the agreement by 1989.
Id. States have discovered that such agreements are not enforceable in practice
unless they can threaten federal agencies with the prospect of punitive fines.
Wolverton, supra note 1, at 584.
157. Wolverton, supra note 1, at 584.
158. For a discussion of the likelihood of states to seek court orders imme-
diately, see supra notes 143-55 and accompanying text. But see Cheng, supra note
1, at 863-64 (noting ineffectiveness of coercive fines on federal agencies).
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fines under FFCA, and/or restructure its cleanup plans com-
pletely under the RCRA amendment.' 59 States may grow even
more antagonistic should federal agencies fail to comply with
FFCA or with state CWA requirements, and may resort to asking
courts for punitive and coercive fines. Most importantly, the pub-
lic may fund the federal government's judgment debts yet see no
appreciable improvement in federal cleanup activity.' 60
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Supreme Court's rule of construing sovereign
immunity waivers may cause serious problems for federal and
state environmental officials. The Ohio Court had the opportunity
to find a complete waiver of sovereign immunity to civil penalties,
yet resorted to "analytical gymnastics" in order to save the fed-
eral government from pending and future civil fines.' 6 ' The deci-
sion forced the passage of FFCA, the result of congressional
compromise with an adamant executive branch. The new ar-
rangement may disrupt the federal-state relationship more than
would the statutory scheme envisioned by the Sixth Circuit. 62 In
order to avoid such outcomes in the future, the Court should
abandon its mechanical rules of statutory construction and be-
come more sensitive to policy considerations and to congres-
sional intent expressed in facially-clear statutes.
Although the Ohio decision pushed Congress and the Presi-
dent to begin constructive action on an overwhelming environ-
mental problem, Congress must move further to head off latent
conflicts. First, Congress should immediately clarify through leg-
islation the penalty-payment issue by making the penalties draw-
able from agency appropriations. This scheme would sustain the
penalties' coercive effect on DOE and would also alert Congress
159. This assumes that federal agencies have effectively prioritized cleanup
plans. As of 1989, only 29 of 724 federal facilities that require cleanup have.,had
a "Remedial Investigation" or "Feasibility Study." Wolverton, supra note 1, at
589. Only 30 of those facilities have been properly cleaned up. S. REP. No. 67,
supra note 1, at 3.
160. Even if coercive or injunctive relief is granted, the federal agency,
through litigation delays, will have gained a "free period" during which the envi-
ronmental situation could worsen. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 1, at 7, reprinted
in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1293.
161. See Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1641 (White, J., dissenting).
162. The Sixth Circuit held that the CWA and RCRA permitted states to
petition courts for civil penalties against federal agencies for noncompliance
with state requirements. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d
1058 (6th Cir. 1990).
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to the size and frequency of state requests for those fines.16 3
As an additional example of good faith, Congress should give
states reassurance that judgments will be paid by immediately
honoring those claims. If the penalties become too burdensome
upon the federal government, Congress could then re-examine
DOE's behavior and the environmental situation to determine
whether additional remedial legislation is necessary. Further-
more, Congress should also amend the CWA to permit states to
receive civil penalties under that Act. This would further heal the
federal-state environmental enforcement relationship and would
aid in preventing dangerous federal facilities from threatening the
nation's waters. Conceivably, Congress and the Clinton Adminis-
tration will have the capacity and the will to implement these
changes and thus fully circumvent the barriers to federal facility
compliance erected by the Ohio Court.
Gregory J. May
163. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 1, at 14, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1300 (showing congressional awareness of amounts and frequency
of state requests for civil penalties).
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